The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Prof. Nils Holtug on the Positive Value of Existence

P.S. You never answered my two questions.

1.) If no state of conscious existence is any better or worse than non-existence, doesn’t it follow that eternal conscious torment is no worse than non-existence (and that there would be nothing morally objectionable in the idea of God knowingly bringing beings doomed to such a fate into existence)?

2.) And wouldn’t there be no logical or moral reason for a materialist (or even for most Christians, who believe that death is total extinction for an animal) to put a suffering animal out of it’s misery?

Aren’t those the unavoidable consequences of the proposition that no state of existence is any better or worse than non-existence?

Michael,

This question requires a distinction I don’t see being made: namely, the difference between my existence as I experience it as a good and my existence as another experiences it as a good.

No one, I don’t think, would say that his conscious experience of existing is “better” than a certain state of existence if his consciousness didn’t exist to begin with. To HIM, he would not know anything at all and so be incapable of valuing one thing over another. But in another persons eyes, surely it makes sense to say that being is better than non being regarding person x?

Thousands of my children don’t exist, and I don’t miss them at all. Does that make me callous?

Of course, if multiverse theories are correct, then every one of my potential children will exist somewhere. Every possible arrangement of particles will exist. Because God is eternally creative, I think it perfectly sensible to argue that everything that can logically exist, does exist. Except for square circles etc, non-existence is non-existent.

If God is omniscient, every proposition He holds to be true must actually be true, right?

So if God holds it to be true that it would be better for Chris to exist in a conscious state of unending happiness, than to exist in a conscious state of unending exquisite pain, that must actually be true, right?

And I don’t see why you think you’d have to exist, and be consciously aware of that truth to make it so.

If you read the paper (even if you only read the abstract), you should realize that Prof. Nils is saying that merely possible people can be benefited or harmed by being brought into existence, and I’m still not sure why you would disagree with this?

Isn’t that the point?

That it’s better to know things like happiness, love, joy, pleasure, and ecstasy, than it is to know nothing; and that it’s better to know nothing than it is to know only meaningless, purposeless, unending, exquisite pain.

And better not just in the eyes of those of us who are here to see that it’s better, but in the sense of ultimate reality.

Now let’s get back to horses.

Assuming (for the sake of this discussion) that animals can really suffer, and that death is the end for them, are you really saying that it wouldn’t be better for a horse to know nothing, than it would for him to know only exquisite pain?

That no matter how extreme the suffering, or how hopeless the condition, you would be doing the poor animal himself no kindness by putting him out of his misery?

Is that logical?

If God were to hold that proposition true, and if he was omniscient, then yes it would have to really be true. But that doesn’t imply that everything imaginable can possibly be true. It may not be possible for God to think the proposition true, in other words. And I don’t believe I’d have to exist to make the thought “If Chris exists in conditions x he will be better off than conditions y.” I would only have to possibly exist, since the statement itself implies nothing about whether or not I actually exist but only, supposing I do, etc.

Perhaps I am missing something in your above quote, but I fail to see the implication you are trying to draw.

“Merely possible people can be benefited or harmed by being brought into existence” seems to put the cart before the horse if you are trying to compare their state of being pre-creation to post-creation from their own subjective viewpoint. But that is an inherent incoherency, in my opinion. I don’t think God compares those two states at all in that way.

I’m not sure how you extrapolated that from me. If I saw an animal in pain and I deemed its suffering had no corrective purpose for its life, I would end its life.

What, if you don’t mind me asking, are you really asking in your example?

What I’m trying to get at is whether you see any states of existence (earthly happiness, heavenly bliss, unending joy in the presence of God, earthly horrors such as Auschwitz, or eternal conscious torment in hell) as objectively better or worse than non-existence?

But why (if no state of existence can be any better or worse than non-existence)?

If that were really true, it would mean that extinguishing the animals life was doing it no service, and letting it go on suffering was doing it no dis-service (because conscious suffering is no worse than non-existence, and non-existence is no better than conscious suffering.)

So (if that were true, and that’s really what you believe) why would you go out of your way to put the suffering animal out of it’s misery, unless it was just to make yourself feel better?

And if you believe that God is the one necessary being, who brought all derivative beings into existence, why do you suppose He would have done that (if no state of existence is any better r worse than non-existence)?

Do you think He just did it to make Himself feel better?

To me, the proposition that no state of existence is better or worse than non-existence argues against the existence of the God proposed by classic Christian Theism, against a loving purpose for creation, and against UR.

So if you believe that no state of conscious existence is any better or worse than non-existence, why would you put a suffering animal out of it’s misery, and why do you suppose God created us?

If I understand you correctly, you disagree with Prof Holtug’s thesis that being brought into existence can be a benefit, so you don’t really see creation as benefiting anyone (except maybe God, who already existed)?

Is that right Chris?

I would distinguish. In God’s mind, certain comparative states of existence are far better than others. But comparing it in the creature’s mind who would not exist, I find such a comparison meaningless.

Because of the impact the suffering would have on me, I would imagine.

Well if that’s the case then your criticism would apply to any possible act I could ever do to the animal. A criticism that admits of no exception is a meaningless one. If you try to compare the subjective experience of “non-existence” to “existence” you are comparing two states of affairs that are not parallel, and if you criticism is based on such a comparison, then it is meaningless, regardless of the scenario you apply it to.

I would do it just to make me feel better. That is my point.

As a matter of fact, I don’t believe it possible to do an act for any other reason.

In an anthropomorphic way, yes, I suppose I would agree with that.

Because creating us fulfills a desire which God has, I would imagine.

Than you don’t really believe there is such a thing as unselfish love, do you?

Silly me, I thought it was out of unselfish love that God brought us into existence, and I thought it was this quality of unselfish love that we were meant to learn from a life of sorrow and joy here, and it turns out (given your reasoning about no state of existence being any better or worse than non-existence) that there’s no such thing.

I thought He brought us into existence to enjoy all the good things He knew we could never enjoy if we didn’t exist, but (according to you) He only did it to make Himself feel better.

Is that what you really believe Chris?

If God’s being is fulfilled in doing all he can for an “other,” then his desire is simply to express himself in such a way. If it “makes God feel better” to give himself to his creation – to die, maybe, on a cross – then is it not true he is acting in order to make himself feel better and also loving you as much as he can?

But his existence, and ours, is really no better than non-existence?

If He had the choice, He might not be here?

And we’re only here to make Him feel better?

Is that right?

That is what you said, isn’t it?

Could you explain how you reasoned that God’s existence is no better than his non-existence?

At the very most, what I said would imply that one could not make any value statements at all comparing a being’s consciousness of existence and non-existence. Therefore it would make no sense to say “God’s existing is no better than his non, etc.” Because that would imply the opposite – i.e. it is better for state of affairs x than y, etc.

But you wouldn’t be able to attach any predicates containing value judgments at all. That is my point. You can’t even compare the two. The only thing you can say is that they’re not comparable. Once you start inferring that this therefore means “state x is better than y” you’ve left the realm of coherent comparison.

I thought you said that existence is no better than non-existence?

As a necessary being, God would have no choice but to exist (and I guess no choice but to create us, if He needs us to fulfill Himself, as you say He does), but if existence is no better or worse than non-existence, it follows that He’d lose nothing if He could choose not to exist.

Any value statements, as in “better or worse,” right?

Yes it would, because “better than” is a value statement!

To say that you can’t make any “value statements” about God’s existence means that you can’t say His existence is any better or worse than His non-existence.

I find that statement completely incoherent.

How would your saying that existence is no better or worse than non-existence imply “it is better for state of affairs x than y, etc.”?

So if I attempt to say that God’s existence (x) is better than His non-existence (y), I’ve left the realm of coherent comparison, right?

Using your logic.

If it’s possible to start over here:

I don’t know if Prof. Holtug is a Theist, but for a Theist (who believes that one loving, necessary being brought all other derivative beings into existence), his thesis would seem to make more sense than saying (as some do) that existence has no value when compared to non-existence.

And I would really like some thoughts on this paper (which was presented at the Oxford-Copenhagen Summit on Ethics in 1999, and at the International Society for Utilitarian Studies conference in North Carolina in 2000.)

[Prof. Nils Holtug on the Positive Value of Existence)

Interesting discussion Michael and you raise some good points. I really would encourage others to reply to your questions as well as raise questions/criticisms of their own. When they do not, then IMO it only emphasises the weakness of their position.
I also do not believe that any person kills a horse in order to make himself/herself feel better.
Whether the mlogic is sound or not, lets be thoughtful and admit that the killing is done because the killer believes the animal is better off not existing any longer.
God bless you

Thank you pilgrim.

And G-d bless you.

Michael, I don’t think you’re grasping my initial point. I’m saying that if you attempt to compare the subjective experience of existence between a person who exists and the same person when he doesn’t exist, the comparison is incoherent. It would make not sense, from this standpoint, to say a state of being was better than non being. But from another’s point of view, it would make perfect sense to say that it is better for person to exist than not exist. I really can’t say it any simpler than that. This doesn’t say anything about the ontological nature of God as a necessary being, whether he exists or if it is possible for him to, etc. it has no bearing on any of these questions.

I don’t think you’re grasping the real issues at all.

If there’s such a thing as objective reality, that point of view would have to be true or false.

And if there is a God, and He’s a perfect Being, He couldn’t have any false beliefs.

So if He believes it’s better for a person to exist than not exist, that would have to be true.

It’s not just a matter of His point of view.

And if “God is Love,” and He doesn’t believe it’s better for any of us to exist than it would be for us not to exist, than why are we here?

And if you say that it’s no better to exist in any state of consciousness than it is not to exist, you’re saying that “The Existing One” is no better than nothing, and His creation has no real value.

On the other hand, it is logically possible to say that there are states of existence that are better than non-existence on the basis of what Prof. Holtug calls “surplus of value.”

[Prof. Nils Holtug on the Positive Value of Existence)

From this it follows (if you’re a Theist) that if God’s existence has a surplus of value, it’s better for Him to exist than it would be (if it were possible) for Him not to exist.

And it follows that if He knows (in His Omniscience) that a creature’s existence will have a surplus of value, He knows that it would be better for that creature to exist than it would be for him not to exist.

He doesn’t “think” it, or “believe” it, and it isn’t true only from His “subjective point of view,” because He doesn’t have any false beliefs.

He knows that existence can be better than non-existence.

And that’s why He, as a God of love, brings derivative beings into existence.

And that’s why we, as creatures, owe Him a debt of gratitude.

All this follows from Prof. Holtug’s thesis here (if you’re a Theist), and your thesis (whether you realize it or not) would deny all of it.

If no state of existence can be any better or worse than non-existence, wouldn’t God (as a perfect Being, with no false beliefs) have to know that that’s true, even of His own existence?

But if Prof. Holtug’s theory of value surplus is true, wouldn’t God (as a perfect Being, with no false beliefs) know that as long as His existence has a surplus of value, it is better for Him to exist than not exist?

And if He knows that existence can be better than non-existence, wouldn’t He (as a God of love) want to share the value that existence has to offer by bringing derivative beings into existence?

How can you say that none of this has anything to do with the nature of God?

If multiverse theory is true, when I kill a horse, there immediately appears another universe in which I do not kill the horse. Similarly, when I die, there immediately appears another universe in which I do not die.

Multiverse theory guarantees individual immortality. It also guarantees that everything that can exist must exist, and makes all talk of non-existence meaningless.