[size=150]I have argued for the Value of Existence View by making the comparative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence. However, some philosophers suggest that it is incoherent to defend the Value of Existence View in this way.[/size] Here are representative observations, made by Derek Parfit and John Broome, respectively:
Causing someone to exist is a special case because the alternative would not have been worse for this person. We may admit that, for this reason, causing someone to exist cannot be better for this person…The argument set out by Parfit and Broome seems to have two premises. According to the first, the judgement that it is better (or worse) to exist than never to exist entails that it is worse (or better) never to exist than to exist. According to the second, it cannot be worse (or better) never to exist. Presumably, the first premise is based on a claim about the logic of “betterness” relation; and presumably, the second premise is based on the following metaphysical principle:
The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle: An individual cannot have any properties if it does not exist. It is because a person who does not exist cannot have any properties that she cannot be worse (or better) off.
The claim that Parfit and Broome are committed to the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle can be disputed, but their argument is best explained by invoking this principle. After all, what reason could there be for denying that it is worse (or better) never to exist, if not because, in general, a person cannot have properties if she does not exist? This interpretation is also suggested by Broome’s remark that “if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been worse for her” (my emphasis). Broome’s point would seem to be that, if a person does not exist, her absence makes it impossible for properties to “stick” to her.
Let us call this argument against the view that existence can be better (worse) than non-existence the “Metaphysical Argument.” Besides being pressed into service by Broome and Parfit, it also seems to be endorsed by David Heyd, who claims it make no sense to regret having been born: For if regret means in this case “being better off not born,” who is the subject of this better state? The answer is that there is no such subject, and hence…such a judgement cannot make sense.
Heyd does not make any explicit claims about the logic of the betterness relation, but he must be assuming that in order for existence to be worse than non-existence, non-existence must be better than existence. If he were not assuming this, the truth of the former claim alone would establish a reason for regret. Also, Heyd seems to invoke the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle when he argues that a person who does not exist cannot be in a state of being better off (for present purposes we can assume that being in such a state is equivalent to having the property of being better off). In this section, I briefly comment on the logic of the betterness relation. In the following section, I shall attempt to show how both premises of the Metaphysical Argument are in fact compatible with my defence of the Value of Existence View.
What logical property, or properties, of the betterness relation ensure that the proposition that existence is better (or worse) than non-existence implies that non-existence is worse (or better) than existence? Such an entailment might be based on the way “better than” and “worse than” are defined.
So consider the following definition:
(1) y is worse than x, if and only if x is better than y.
How will (1) help Broome, Heyd and Parfit? If we substitute non-existence and existence for x and y we get: (2) Existence is worse than non-existence, if and only if non-existence is better than existence. This may seem to establish the entailment our authors require. However, what is needed is not a two-place but a three-place predicate, since the claim at issue is that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence. So let us consider the following definition:
(3) y is worse for S than x, if and only if x is better for S than y
.
(3) states that if existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, non-existence is worse (or better) for her. And the claim that non-existence is worse (or better) for her seems to violate the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It seems to ascribe to her the property of being worse (or better) off in a possible world in which she does not exist.
So (3), then, seems to be just what Broome, Heyd and Parfit need.
- METAPHYSICS
Let us now examine more closely the second premise in the Metaphysical Argument – the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. What exactly is it that this principle rules out regarding the properties of non-existent individuals? Consider what we may call a positive property such as having black hair. This property is instantiated in any object that has black hair. Certainly, the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that individuals can have positive properties if they do not exist.
Now, according to the Metaphysical Argument, we cannot claim that existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, because this implies that non-existence is worse (or better) for her than existence, and this is ruled out by the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. Let us now re-assess this argument. Consider the following (allegedly dubious) proposition:
P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.
The question is whether the truth of P can be established without ascribing positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist. In my main argument, I described different theories of well-being on the basis of which the Value of Existence View can be defended. Each of these theories involves distinctive ontological commitments. Invoking the object account of preferences, I argued that existence is better for Jeremy because he prefers existence to non-existence. And it may now be argued that, for the same reason, non-existence is worse for him. Here, the truth of P is established merely by appeal to a preference Jeremy has in a possible world – the actual world – in which he exists. In this world, then, he has the positive property of having a particular preference. More importantly, the truth of P is established without ascribing any positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.
[size=150]The three other theories of well-being on the basis of which I argued for the Value of Existence View involved a two-step procedure. First, it was pointed out that Jeremy’s life includes a surplus of positive value (preference-satisfactions, positive mental states, or items on an objective list), and that his non-existence involves no such values. Both of these claims are, of course, compatible with the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It was then pointed out that it seems to be better to have a surplus of positive value than to have no value. Contrariwise, it seems to be worse to have no value than it is to have a surplus of value. This judgement relies only on the nature of positive value and no value. Thus, assuming any of these other theories of well-being, once again, the truth of P is established without presupposing any dubious ontology.[/size] It may be objected that I have not yet shown that P is metaphysically innocent. It may be argued that, if P is true, it must be true in virtue of a particular relation that obtains and serves as a truthmaker for P. More precisely, the (triadic) relation x is worse for S than y must obtain between the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, Jeremy, and the state of affairs, Jeremy exists. Now, Jeremy exists and thus the state of affairs, Jeremy exists, obtains. But the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not obtain. So how can the betterness relation obtain, when one of its relata does not?
It seems clear that, in fact, a state need not obtain in order to be an object in a betterness relation. Consider, for instance, the following relation: the state of affairs that the allies win the war is better than the state of affairs that the Nazis win the war
.
A more plausible requirement, then, is that in order for a relation to obtain, its relata must exist. And while the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not obtain, it can be sensibly claimed that it exists as an abstract entity. Since all three relata thus exist, we can claim that the triadic relation, Jeremy does not exist is worse for Jeremy than Jeremy exists, obtains.
Therefore, assuming that this relation is indeed the truthmaker for P, P is true.
Nevertheless, perhaps Broome, Heyd and Parfit’s point is not that P cannot be true. Perhaps their point is that it cannot be true if Jeremy does not come into existence. Indeed, this (counterfactual) situation seems to be what Broome aims at in the passage quoted above: “if it were better for a person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than if she had lived” (my emphasis). However, (3) does not claim that if existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence, then if Jeremy does not exist, non-existence is worse for him than existence. In order for this to follow, we would have to accept something like:
(4) If x is better (or worse) for S than y, then x is better (or worse) for S than y even if x obtains.
How does (4) challenge my argument for the Value of Existence View? I have argued that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence. (3) then implies that non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence. And given this implication, (4) implies that even if Jeremy had not existed, nonexistence would be worse for him. But the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that Jeremy can have any positive properties, including relational ones, if he does not exist. So it would seem that my claim that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence leads to a contradiction.
However, nothing forces us to accept (4). In fact, assuming the account of the truthmaking relation suggested above, we may have reason to reject
(4), at least in cases in which x implies the non-existence of S.
Consider again P.
Since Jeremy exists, P is true in virtue of the obtaining of the truthmaking relation. But if, instead, we assume that Jeremy does not exist, P does not preserve this truth value for the simple reason that one of the relata, Jeremy, does not exist. Thus, we have a perfectly natural explana-tion of why (4) does not hold in such cases. The metaphysical basis for P is not preserved.
So much for the Metaphysical Argument. [size=150]Before I move on, note that nothing in my defense of the Value of Existence View in this section hinges on the fact that Jeremy exists. Even if Jeremy had never come into existence, it would still be true that, had he been caused to exist, he may have benefited. Had he been caused to exist the relevant relation would obtain (or so we may assume), and so he would have benefited from coming into existence.[/size]